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DECISION MAKING: I I I - INCOMPLETE  INITIAL INFORMATION
V. ZHUKOVIN,  Z. ALIMBARASHVILI
ABSTRACT: In the item there are presented Interval Structure allow to extend the class of 
multicriteria  decision making problems including  incomplete Initial Information. this step will 
facilitate dada gathering in pairs matching for decision making.
Introduction. 1. Some information about multicriteria   decision making problems. Given finite 
set X  of competitive decisions (alternatives). Its elements are  nixi ,...,1, = , that is  Xxi ∈ . A 
information structure is determinate on this set: Str. Then decision making problem may be 
presented by pair:
StrXD ,=                                                                  (1)
  Information structure is formed on the bast of  data which we receive from different origin. It 
may be presented by different mathematical  means. Le1 examine two of them.
a) Given m - dimensional criteria space of the base of  m  effectiveness criteria  mjK j ,...,1, =
a point estimate (a point) correspond all  Xxi ∈  in this space. Thus following vector - criterion 
define this information structure in this case:
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Let us examine this structure. We have complete initial information. The  special preference  
relation kRΠ  will be determined in pairs set   XXE •=  which is named Pareto - domination. 
Pareto – set  kk XRX ΠΠΠ =)(   correspond it. This is a set of effective decisions and only one of 
them may be chosen in decision making.
b) In this case information structure is presented as following:
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When  mjER j ÷=⊂ 1,  are scalar binary preference relations and R is Vector Preference 
Relation (VPR).
Let us introduce the Pareto - domination for this case:
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(4) and corresponding its the Pareto - set.
)( RR RXX ΠΠΠ =                                                                (5)
If all preference relation   mjR j ÷= 1,  are transitive then R is transitive too and  ∅≠
RXΠ . It 
means that structure (2) is wider structure (2) because (2) is included in (2). This statement is 
verified by following transformation:
{ })()(),( qjijqij xKxKExxR ≥∈=                                         (6)
that  is an effectiveness  criterion jK  always can be  transformed in  preference relation jR  of 
course, Decision  Maker (DM) must choose the acceptable compromise decision only in Paret –
Set RXΠ . This structure work only on the base of complete information, that  is all decision pairs 
are ordered.
Interval structure [2]. We isolate this class of decision making because it is principle in the 
description of the decision making problems with incomplete initial information. We notice it by 
IntStr. The intervals are closed and finite. They are situated in real-valued axis, that is:
,];[ ba=∆ where  ab ≥                                                             (7)
(7) and  b, a are number  from Re. Zero – interval corresponds   ab = .
  Let us examine some finite set of intervals:
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(8) where   ];[ jjj ba=∆   and  Re, ∈jj ba  for all   mj ÷= 1 . Let us introduce the binary 
preference relation  sL  defined in the pairs set InInQ ×= .
   Interval Structure InStr is presented by following rule:
{ }qiqis baLInStr ≥= ),(: ∆∆                                             (9)
 (9) Let us examine  it. sL  is strict(index S), unconnected  (some pairs are mutually disjoint) and 
transitive. Therefore its Pareto-set is nonempty, that is we examine the  interval  set  with finite  
j
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max and this is guarantee of exist of  Pareto-set.
I I I - Incomp1ecte Initial Information (variant kStr ). Working with real objects very often 
we can't receive the point estimations of alternatives on the bases of vector = criterion. Then 
interval estimates may be used for description of incompleteness. In addition these intervals must 
following conditions:
- one interval correspond one point estimation of one Xxi ∈  on one effectiveness criterion 
njK j ÷= 1 .
- in  addition the point estimation always must be in corresponding it the interval.
-  all intervals are finite, that is all intervals must be limited above below.
 Thus when we receive and form incomplete initial information for decision making in fact we 
transform initial  multicriteria    decision  making problem into the interval structure:
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(10) Now this is with vector interval structure corresponding vector criterion. The following  
steps are known. Pareto - domination is defined:
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(1l) This is a. sca1ar, strict unconnected and transitive preference  relation defined on intervals 
set 0Λ ,  corresponding   X - set. On the base of this preference relation Pareto-set  
LXΠ  formed. 
It is proved that        Lk XX ΠΠ ⊂ .
I I I - Incomplete: Initial Information (variant RStr ).  principal element. It contain m 
components, which are scalar binary preference relations mjR j ÷= 1 . Let us examine one of 
them. Let us suppose that it is connected that is all pairs of decision are matching. In item [1] we 
presented the base of in this variant  vector preference relation, noted VPR (2), is theory about 
Superiority Degree (SD) one decision over other. This is numerical skew - symmetry function 
);( qij xxZ defined on the pairs decisions that is on E-set. Having  jR  we can form corresponding 
SD. If jR  is connected then we always can the base of SD form  Utility Function (UF) defined 
on X- set and coordinated with jR . Let note it by )( ij xϕ - order scale );( qi xxZ  and  )( ixϕ  may 
be determinate  for VPR R(2)  too.
Definition. VPR R[formula (2)] is unconnected even if one of  mjR j ÷= 1  is unconnected .
  If this case the  incompleteness  of' initial information is connected with unconnected of VPR  
R. Let us give for niXxi ÷=∈ 1, , all decisions  in X which are incomparable  with it.
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Where )( ij xN is set of decisions in which are incomparable with  ix  epsilon X  by  jR .
  At first step we suppose that decision preference all Nxq ∈  , where
mj NNNNN ⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕= ......21                            (13)
The operant  ⊕  consider that the intersection of these sets (let us say  r sets) is contained in N -
set r ones. This new information is added to initial information and now R  is connected. Then 
we can define upper utility function  )( ixϕ . Than we suppose that all  Nxq ∈  preference ix   add 
this information to initial information. Now R is connected too and we can define lower utility 
function   )( ixϕ , It holds:
)()( ii xx ϕϕ ≥    for  all     Xxi ∈                                 (14)
Where  true utility function )( ixϕ  is in intervals:
)(,)(,];[ iiiiiii xbxaba ϕϕ ===∆                              (15)
Thus we transform the structure RStr  in the structure. It is known what must be done later (the 
part 3 of this item)
Additional Information (AI). These structures must be realize on computer as the dialogue 
procedure of  decision making with incomplete initial information (I I I) -procedure. Working 
with it in concrete problem  situation we  may  receive  additional information. In this item we 
don't examine false information but only true information. In contract  initial intervals and form 
new interval structure  noted  by IntStr(a). Following results holds:
  Statement.
1) For variant kStr :
LLk XaXX ΠΠΠ ⊆⊆ )(                                              (16)
2) For variant RStr :
LLR XaXX ΠΠΠ ⊆⊆ )(                                               (17)
where )(aX LΠ  is Pareto -set of new interval structure, and 
kXΠ  , 
RXΠ correspond complete 
information.
Thus we  have a system (mathematical) of nonempty Pareto-sets, imbedded one to other. The 
similar result we have abstained for l -level preference relations [1;2]. On the base of it dialogue 
procedures effectively are formed because corresponding Pareto-set is connected with existing 
information.
Inference. Conclusion.
This structures must be realize on computer. In practice working with them in concrete situation 
we haven't possibility to obtain complete information at least initially. Our approach must be 
facilitate dale  gathering - initial and  additional. In this connection the interval structures play a 
important part.
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